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INTRODUCTION 
nelected judges in democracies are embodiments of coun-
termajoritarianism.1 Unlike democratic legislators and 
accountable parliamentarians, judges do not represent constit-
uency interests, nor are they directly accountable to the peo-
ple.2 Ironically, the countermajoritarianism of unelected judges 
                                                                                                             
* J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School. J.S.M. (Stanford), LL.M. (Harvard), 
LL.B. (Mumbai). I am grateful to Professor Helen Stacy for her excellent and 
thought-provoking course on international human rights at Stanford. I am 
especially grateful to Fernan Restrepo for all his help with and advice on the 
quantitative component of my paper. I thank Professor Kate Malleson for 
discussing the judicial appointments system in the United Kingdom with me. 
I am also grateful to Nicholas Cade, Alexander Csordas, and the editorial 
team at the Brooklyn Journal of International Law. Any faults with this Arti-
cle are my own. 
 1. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962). 
 2. The conventional argument is that judiciaries in liberal democracies 
are “democratic” for two reasons: (1) they are appointed by elected branches 
U
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is considered to be their greatest virtue in a democracy. Judges 
are meant to protect “discrete and insular minorities”3 from the 
obdurate will of the majority.4 They constitute pockets of liber-
tarianism within democracy’s Benthamite obsession for the 
greatest good of the greatest number.5 International courts 
should be no different, and unlike deliberative international 
treaty-making organs, international judges do not represent 
the viewpoints of their constituencies. Unlike the Security 
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, for 
example, judges appointed to the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) do not represent the values or interests of their home 
countries. Yet, international instruments require that the com-
position of international courts and tribunals must fairly re-
flect the diverse geographic realities of the geopolitical world.6 
Deliberative bodies are representative, but courts are not—
why, then, does the international system insist on appointing 
judges from different geographic regions to international courts 
and tribunals? 
Legal realists may find the short answer—legitimacy—to be 
unsatisfactory. True, a “rainbow court”7 which fairly reflects 
the demographic characteristics of the region in which it is sit-
uated might be perceived as being more legitimate, but inter-
national courts are seldom honestly diverse. Judges of “P5” 
countries disproportionately serve on these courts, and judge-
ships on international courts are staffed in such a manner that 
the region which has the most interest in the court’s outcomes 
gets the most representation on the court.8 Since the 1930s,9 
                                                                                                             
of government, from whom they derive their political legitimacy; and (2) polit-
ical branches of government retain the power to remove judges. 
 3. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 4. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104 (1980). 
 5. The reference here is to Jeremy Bentham who advocated the idea of 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. See D.D. RAPHAEL, BRITISH 
MORALISTS 1650-1800, at 314–46 (Hackett Publ’g Co. 1991) (1969). 
 6. See infra notes 43–56 and accompanying text. 
 7. This is a term which is often used in the context of the South Africa 
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Appointments to the House of 
Lords: Who Goes Upstairs, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS 1876–2009, at 
112, 115 (Louis Blom-Cooper et al. eds., 2009). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 50–56. The “P5 countries” (the per-
manent members of the United Nations Security Council) are the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. 
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legal realists have claimed that judges decide cases on the ba-
sis of “pre-existing social and political commitments.”10 On in-
ternational judicial bodies, for example, there is evidence to in-
dicate that the proportion of judges from common law countries 
on a panel will affect the likelihood of dissent,11 and that judges 
of the European Court of Human Rights who were formerly 
government lawyers will be far more deferential towards raison 
d’état than private lawyers or academics.12 Scholars have ex-
tensively debated whether a statistically significant level of 
alignment exists between a judge on an international tribunal 
and the judge’s home country.13 Consciously or unconsciously, 
then, judges from certain backgrounds might be more (or less) 
partial to certain causes. Does the geographic background of an 
international judge impact the manner in which he or she de-
cides cases? If so, is the legitimacy of regionally diverse courts 
offset by the fear of bias? 
In this Article, I seek to quantitatively understand how geo-
graphic diversity impacts decision making on the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”). So far, the ICC has dealt exclusively 
with cases arising out of the African continent.14 Against this 
backdrop, increasing numbers of judges from the African Group 
of States have been appointed to the ICC, perhaps on an im-
plicit understanding that their presence on the court is essen-
tial to preserve its legitimacy. My research question is: does the 
presence of a higher number of judges from the African Group 
of States impact the court’s attitude towards African defend-
ants? With an increase in the number of judges from the Afri-
can Group of States appointed to the ICC, has the court become 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals 
Revisited: The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689, 689 (2004). 
 10. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 263 
(2006). 
 11. See Allison Danner & Erik Voeten, Who Is Running the International 
Criminal Justice System?, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 35, 37 (Deborah D. 
Avant et al. eds., 2010). 
 12. See Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 390–91 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in Internation-
al Courts, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 224–36 (1969); Erik Voeten, The Impartiali-
ty of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human 
Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417–18 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Is Africa on Trial?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:21 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17513065. 
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more (or less) pro-defendant in its approach, at a statistically 
significant level, controlling for other factors? If so, can an ar-
gument plausibly be made that a disproportionately “diverse” 
court undermines its own legitimacy by making it susceptible 
to bias? 
Part I begins by analyzing formal rules and informal norms 
that require national and international courts to be staffed by 
“diverse” judges, in order to understand the purposes that di-
versity serves on courts and to develop a framework for deter-
mining when those purposes may be compromised. Much of the 
literature acknowledges that diversity lends legitimacy to 
courts by making judges “inclusive symbols,” and it typically 
refutes claims of bias by arguing that diversity makes courts 
“structurally impartial.”15 However, the literature does not ac-
count for the fact that diversity on courts, especially interna-
tional courts, is seldom “fair” or “equitable.” The diversity rules 
of the ICC will be situated within the wider context of this dis-
cussion. Part II examines formal and informal diversity ar-
rangements for staffing judgeships on the ICC. In Part III, by 
coding decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC issued be-
tween 2006–2012, and carrying out a logistic regression analy-
sis, this Article presents evidence that suggests that the geo-
graphic background of judges, amongst other factors, potential-
ly does make a difference to the manner in which international 
judges decide cases. This Article presents quantitative evidence 
that suggests that the post-2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC, 
which had a higher number of judges from the African Group of 
States serving on it as compared to the pre-2009 Appeals 
Chamber, held against African defendants at a statistically 
significant level compared to the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber. I 
conclude with a discussion of what this could potentially mean 
for the legitimacy of international judicial institutions. Data 
concerning the judges of the ICC and its decisions have been 
obtained from the website of the ICC.16 
I. THE DIVERSITY DEBATE 
Proponents of diversity argue that it enhances a court’s legit-
imacy, builds public confidence in the court, remedies past ine-
                                                                                                             
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 38–42. 
 16. INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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qualities, and improves the quality of decision making on the 
court by bringing a diversity of perspectives to its opinions.17 A 
court which fairly reflects18 different religious, ethnic, geo-
graphic, gender, or racial components of society may signal 
that it is “open to all.”19 Scholars have suggested that diversity 
on courts may have symbolic or descriptive value on the one 
hand, or substantive value on the other.20 
At the symbolic or descriptive level, a judge from a “nontradi-
tional”21 background may become an inclusive symbol, or stand 
for something he or she physically resembles, despite not nec-
essarily holding the same viewpoints of members of the com-
munity for which she stands or appears to represent. For ex-
ample, Clarence Thomas, an African American justice on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, does not share the views held by many 
members of the African American community in civil liberties 
cases,22 although he stands for or symbolizes members of that 
community on the U.S. Supreme Court because he physically 
resembles them. 
At the substantive level, a “nontraditional” judge is more 
than a mere “cosmetic symbol”23 on a court. By their very pres-
ence on a bench, judges of “nontraditional” backgrounds may 
remove the prejudices that their colleagues may have about 
members of their community.24 Such a judge may also bring 
“traditionally excluded” perspectives to the cases being decided 
by the court. For example, feminist “difference theorists” argue 
                                                                                                             
 17. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz, Women and Minorities on State and Federal 
Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 84–85 (2001). 
 18. See Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimen-
sions and Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 590, 633–35 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschênes 
eds., 1985). 
 19. See Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diver-
sity in American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 156 (2004). 
 20. Hanna Pitkin used the terms “descriptive” and “symbolic” to describe 
representation. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION 11 (1967). 
 21. Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton’s Nontraditional 
Judges: Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1994); 
Elliot E. Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench: Gender, Race and Judicial 
Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 371, 372 (1984). 
 22. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Mod-
els and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 482 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 480. 
 24. See Westergren, supra note 9, at 699. 
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that women bring different attitudes and values (e.g., caring, 
empathy, community) to cases as opposed to men (e.g., abstrac-
tion, individualism).25 There is empirical evidence, for example, 
to suggest that women judges are harsher on women defend-
ants.26 Minority judges might bring “special sensitivity” or 
“unique perspectives” to decision making.27 However, viewed 
through this prism, appointing a judge to a court on diversity 
considerations may enhance the legitimacy and public appeal 
of the court, but it may simultaneously strike a pejorative blow 
to the community sought to be represented by the appointment. 
After all, how can one unelected person “symbolize” or even 
“represent” the views of a community of others? This form of 
diversity representation presupposes unanimity of opinions 
within the community sought to be represented, and under-
mines the very system of diversity it attempts to create. An un-
elected judge from a certain racial, religious, ethnic, geograph-
ic, or gender background cannot conceivably represent the di-
verse values and opinions within the community. For this rea-
son, appointing a minority judge to a court purely on diversity 
grounds would undermine the diversity of opinion which pre-
vails within the community to which the judge belongs. 
Some critics of diversity on courts argue that it conflicts with 
the principle of merit in selecting judges. One scholar calls this 
the “merit/diversity paradox”: an apparent conflict between ei-
ther selecting the best judges to a court, or selecting judges 
that best reflect the members of the society in which the court 
is situated.28 However, there are at least three reasons why di-
versity considerations for judicial appointments do not conflict 
with the merit principle. First, scholars have suggested that 
merit is not necessarily compromised when judges from diverse 
backgrounds are selected to courts.29 History provides that jus-
tices selected to the U.S. Supreme Court on diversity consider-
                                                                                                             
 25. See id. at 691. 
 26. See John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judg-
es, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 308, 320 (1981); Westergren, supra note 9, at 698. 
 27. Goldman & Saronson, supra note 21, at 68. 
 28. Leny E. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, Merit Selection and Diversity in the 
Dutch Judiciary, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 145, 145 (Kate Malleson & 
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). 
 29. See, e.g., BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT? THE 
IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 4 (1991). 
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ations always met a minimum standard of merit, and a few of 
them even went on to become some of the greatest justices the 
Court had ever seen.30 Second, merit cannot be defined in a so-
cial or contextual vacuum. Within the Indian context, George 
H. Gadbois has suggested that the idea of merit is contextual.31 
The diversity of a “nontraditional” judge might well be consid-
ered an element of his or her own individual merit. Third, the 
very idea of merit may be “self-reflective,”32 “self-select[ing],”33 
or “self-cloning.” In other words, the definition of merit varies 
with the persons who judge merit—judges of merit, consciously 
or unconsciously, may seek a replication of their own creden-
tials in the candidate they seek out. The judge of merit may 
seek out a candidate who is least likely to challenge the estab-
lishment.34 Some scholars have suggested that it is a “myth” 
that merit is a neutral standard.35 The conflict between merit 
and diversity has also been categorized as one between tradi-
tionalists and behavioralists—the former want judges to objec-
tively and neutrally find the law, the latter recognize that judg-
ing is inherently a political process.36 
Other critics of diversity argue that it conflicts with demo-
cratic theory in that judges, unlike legislators, are not meant to 
“represent” constituents.37 In this sense, judges from “nontradi-
tional” backgrounds who bring the perspectives of their com-
munity to cases threaten to make themselves less impartial to 
their community’s viewpoint.38 Much of the scholarly literature 
argues that judges are seldom neutral adjudicators—judging, 
                                                                                                             
 30. See id. 
 31. See generally George H. Gadbois, Jr., Judicial Appointments in India: 
The Perils of Non-Contextual Analysis, 7 ASIAN THOUGHT & SOC’Y 124, 124–43 
(1982). 
 32. Kate Malleson, Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case for Positive Action, 
36 J.L. & SOC’Y 376, 381 (2009) (quoting Sian Elias, Chief Justice of N.Z., Ad-
dress to the Australian Women Lawyers’ Conference (June 13, 2008), 
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/13-06-08.pdf). 
 33. Rachel Davis & George Williams, Reform of the Judicial Appointments 
Process: Gender and the Bench of the High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 819, 835 (2003). 
 34. See Lady Hale, Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Ju-
diciary, 56 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 281, 282 (2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Davis & Williams, supra note 33, at 830–33. 
 36. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 138. 
 37. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 34, at 287. 
 38. See id. 
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in constitutional cases, is a political process—and personal val-
ue choices often color decisions.39 For this reason, it is argued 
that “nontraditional” or “traditionally excluded” judges on a 
panel may ensure that no single set of people or values domi-
nates a court’s opinions.40 In this sense, diversity is said to en-
hance the “structural impartiality” of the court.41 There is also 
the criticism that allowing judicial appointments to be made on 
considerations other than merit, like diversity, will inappropri-
ately afford a backdoor entry for political influence to enter the 
system of judicial appointments.42 However, this argument 
once again assumes that diversity candidates appointed to 
courts are non-meritorious. Ensuring that such candidates 
meet a certain threshold level of merit may serve to exclude 
political influence. 
A. Geographic Diversity 
There is a particularly large volume of literature on geo-
graphic diversity in international bodies.43 Article 23 of the 
U.N. Charter calls on the General Assembly to elect non-
permanent members to the Security Council, keeping in mind 
the principle of “equitable geographical distribution.”44 This 
principle seems to have percolated into international judicial 
bodies as well, even though judges nominated by states are not 
state representatives and do not represent national interests. 
International judicial bodies have formal mechanisms for en-
suring geographic diversity. Although judges on the ICJ are 
required to be appointed regardless of their nationality,45 the 
statute of the ICJ formally provides that no two judges on the 
court can belong to the same nationality.46 Similarly, formal 
                                                                                                             
 39. See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 22, at 411–12. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality 
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 106 (1997). 
 42. See Malleson, supra note 32, at 378. 
 43. See, e.g., Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More 
Representative Body of the Entire U.N. Membership, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 319 
(2000); Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A 
New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 319 
(2000). 
 44. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. 
 45. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 2, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 46. See id. art. 3, para. 1. 
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provisions exist on the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)47 and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).48 However, informal norms de-
termine geographic representation on these bodies, and state 
representation on these bodies is not always equal. According-
ly, “a judge from each P-5 member, except for China, has sat . . 
. on the ICJ since the Court’s inception,”49 and the remaining 
ten seats on the court are distributed regionally, such that Af-
rica gets three seats (one seat each for North Africa, franco-
phone Sub-Saharan Africa, and anglophone Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca), Western Europe/Other, Latin America/Caribbean, and Asia 
each hold two seats, and one seat goes to Eastern Europe.50 
This arrangement matches the distribution of non-permanent 
seats on the Security Council.51 Judges of P5 countries have 
also consistently held seats on either the ICTY or the ICTR.52 
However, judgeships on the ICTY are dominated by Western 
judges, while judgeships on the ICTR are dominated by African 
judges,53 indicating that geographic representation on these 
bodies is organized in such a manner that the region that has 
the most interest in the tribunal’s outcomes, or in the stability 
of the area with which the tribunal deals, gets the most repre-
sentation on the tribunal.54 It seems apparent that “equitable” 
geographic distribution on these bodies does not mean “equal” 
representation, and, in this sense, state representation on in-
ternational judicial bodies does not comport with the principle 
of the sovereign equality of states, especially on account of the 
dominance of powerful states on these bodies. On the other 
hand, an informal norm dictates that each member state of the 
European Court of Justice gets to appoint a judge to the 
                                                                                                             
 47. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 12, 
para. 1, May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827. 
 48. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 11, 
para. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955. 
 49. Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organi-
zation: The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 
229 (2009). 
 50. See id. at 231. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 229–30. 
 53. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 11, at 49. 
 54. See id. at 50. 
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court.55 Geographic representation is perceived as being neces-
sary for the legitimacy of these international judicial bodies.56 
Geographic representation was an important consideration in 
staffing appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court up until the 
late nineteenth century. The convention of seeking to achieve a 
geographically balanced court began with President George 
Washington himself, who emphasized “geographic suitability” 
on the court because he wanted to be “president of all the 
states of the fledgling nation,” and who consequently rewarded 
a strategic state with a Supreme Court appointment on occa-
sion.57 Barbara Perry notes that the convention of balancing 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s membership by state or region was 
meant to make the court an “inclusive symbol.”58 This conven-
tion was said to be especially relevant in the early history of 
the United States,59 a time period when U.S. Supreme Court 
justices “rode circuit,”60 knowledge of local laws was neces-
sary,61 and when “regional disputes were the foremost conflict 
of the era.”62 There was an informal practice that New Eng-
land, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York would get seats on 
the U.S. Supreme Court.63 The 1999 edition of Henry J. Abra-
                                                                                                             
 55. See Cogan, supra note 50, at 233. 
 56. See Medard R. Rwelamira, Composition and Administration of the 
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 153, 165–66 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); William J. Aceves, Critical Ju-
risprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Dis-
tribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 384–85 (2001). 
 57. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 78–79 (3d ed. 1992). 
 58. PERRY, supra note 29, at 4. 
 59. See F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A 
System in Transition, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 56, 58 (Kate Malleson & 
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006); Barbara A. Perry, The Life and Death of the 
“Catholic Seat” on the United States Supreme Court, 6 J.L. & POL. 55, 56 
(1989). 
 60. “Riding circuit” involved going to different states and serving as a cir-
cuit court judge. See David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should 
Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2007). 
 61. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 5; Paul A. Freund, The New England Seat 
on the Supreme Court, 87 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 32, 32 (1975). 
 62. Jeffrey Toobin, Diverse Opinions, NEW YORKER, June 8, 2009, at 37. 
 63. See id.; John W. Whitehead & John M. Beckett, A Dysfunctional Su-
preme Court: Remedies and a Comparative Analysis, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
171, 195 (2009). 
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ham’s classical work on U.S. Supreme Court justices reveals 
that the states of New York, Virginia, Ohio, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, in that order, had the highest 
number of justices appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
that justices had been appointed to the Court from thirty-one of 
the nation’s fifty states.64 
By the late nineteenth century, the notion of “geographic 
suitability” faded. Perry attributes three reasons to the demise 
of the convention of geographic balance in staffing appoint-
ments to the U.S. Supreme Court. First, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals Act of 1891 ended the practice of circuit-riding, and 
with it the practical necessity of having Supreme Court justices 
with knowledge of local laws.65 Second, with the end of the Civ-
il War, the “old order” came to an end, and the forces of region-
alism diminished in strength.66 Finally, other “representative” 
factors, such as religion, race, ethnicity, and gender, lessened 
the importance of geography as a measure of diversity.67 How-
ever, geography was still given some weight until the mid-
twentieth century,68 with Richard Nixon being the last presi-
dent to seriously take into account geographic considerations.69 
When it existed, the norm of geographic diversity granted legit-
imacy to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions—one scholar ar-
gues that the fact that the Court’s desegregation decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education was issued by a court that includ-
ed one justice each from Alabama (Justice Hugo Black), Ken-
tucky (Justice Forman Reed), and Texas (Justice Tom Clark) 
bolstered the legitimacy of the decision.70 Today, geographic 
representation is said to be irrelevant for judicial appointments 
                                                                                                             
 64. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 46 
(1999). See also ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 62. 
 65. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 7; John Benjamin Ashby, Supreme Court 
Appointments Since 1937, at 15–16 (Jan. 1972) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Notre Dame). 
 66. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 7. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 254 (stating that even President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower—in office from 1953 to 1961—considered “geographic 
balance” on the Supreme Court to be important). 
 69. See Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26 
J.L. & POL. 425, 457 (2011). 
 70. See Freund, supra note 61, at 44. 
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to the U.S. Supreme Court.71 For example, few commentators 
noted the fact that Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and William 
Rehnquist served on the same court despite both being from 
the state of Arizona.72 
Judges are appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada by an 
informal norm of geographic representation, although formal 
law only requires that three judges be appointed to the court 
from the province of Quebec.73 Informally, three judges are ap-
pointed to the court from Ontario, one from Atlantic Canada,74 
and two from the western provinces75—typically one from Brit-
ish Columbia and one from the three Prairie76 provinces.77 On-
tario’s presence on the court declined to two judges in 1979, 
with the appointment of William McIntyre (British Columbia) 
to replace Wishart Spence, although this was rectified in 1982 
with the appointment of Bertha Wilson (Ontario) following 
Ronald Martland’s retirement.78 There is some debate as to 
whether at least one of the non-Quebec judges should be fran-
cophone, and whether one of the Quebec judges should be an-
glophone.79 By convention, since the 1930s the post of Chief 
Justice has also typically alternated between a judge from 
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(2005). 
 78. See id. at 13 n.32. 
 79. See id. at 22. 
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Quebec and a judge from the rest of Canada.80 This form of re-
gional representation on the Canadian Supreme Court is 
meant to reassure provinces that their special circumstances 
will receive a “fair hearing.”81 Peter McCormick says that 
though regional representation on the Canadian Supreme 
Court is a “very strong convention,”82 it “complicate[s] the pro-
fessionalism of a merit-based system”—after all, “what if the 
objectively best judges at the occasion of any vacancy, over and 
over again, are sitting on the Ontario Court of Appeal, easily 
and always the country’s strongest provincial court of ap-
peal?”83 
A similar convention of geographic representation exists in 
Europe. In the United Kingdom there is a tradition of ensuring 
“an appropriate ethnic balance” on the House of Lords by con-
ferring representation to all three of the nation’s constituent 
parts84—two judges typically hail from Scotland85 and one from 
Northern Ireland86—although the convention of having one 
judge from Northern Ireland serving on the court is not as 
firmly followed.87 There is also a debate in the United Kingdom 
as to whether one judge should be appointed from Wales.88 
There is some indication that judgeships on the Federal Con-
stitutional Court of Germany are “distributed proportionately 
on the basis of geographical origin and party affiliation”89—that 
seats are evenly distributed on the court between the four re-
gions of Germany: Bavaria, the Rhineland, the Northeast, and 
                                                                                                             
 80. List of Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Cana
da (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 81. Morton, supra note 59, at 58. 
 82. McCormick, supra note 77, at 13. 
 83. Id. at 22. 
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Southwestern Germany.90 The 1814 constitution of the Nether-
lands provided that judges of the Supreme Court should be 
picked from “all provinces and landscapes,”91 although this was 
“last referred to” in 1902.92 Geographic considerations are irrel-
evant on the High Court of Australia, where appointments are 
driven by considerations of merit,93 but where, consequently, 
some states see greater representation than others.94 
In India, an attempt is made to ensure that judges of the Su-
preme Court represent the different geographic regions.95 Fur-
ther, seats on the Supreme Court of India are sought to be dis-
tributed between states. Not more than two (or in rare cases, 
three) judges belonging to the same High Court serve on the 
Supreme Court of India at the same time.96 Judges are consid-
ered to belong to the region or state where they were first ap-
pointed as a High Court judge,97 irrespective of where they 
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were born, where they lived for most of their life, or what their 
mother tongue is. The most striking illustration of this oc-
curred during Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan’s term between 
2007-2010, during which the retirement of a judge each from 
the states of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab 
and Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Assam (including 
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and Aru-
nachal Pradesh), and from the National Capital Territory of 
Delhi, was compensated by appointing to the Supreme Court of 
India one judge from each of those respective states or territo-
ries.98 “The court has grown more geographically inclusive with 
every passing decade.”99 
B. Religion, Race, and Gender 
On national courts, religion, race, and gender have typically 
supplanted geographic diversity as criteria for staffing judge-
ships. Religion was an informal factor considered while making 
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court starting with the late 
nineteenth century, although its role substantially, if not en-
tirely, diminished by the late twentieth century.100 The U.S. 
Constitution prohibits religious tests for public office, and the 
practice of appointing justices to the Court for the religion they 
represent could therefore only be an informal one.101 Presidents 
who appointed justices belonging to religious minority commu-
nities often did so to reward their core constituency or to at-
                                                                                                             
 98. See Chandrachud, supra note 95. 
 99. Abhinav Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria 
in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India (May 2012) (unpublished 
SPILS master’s thesis, Stanford Law School) (on file with Stanford Law 
School). 
 100. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 63–64; THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS 
W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO 
THE SUPREME COURT 144–46 (1978); PERRY, supra note 29, at 46–47, 79–81; 
Sheldon Goldman, Why We Have a Catholic-Majority Court: The Politics of 
Appointing Catholics to the Federal Courts, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 193, 202 
(2006); Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law 
and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 127 (2006); Perry, supra note 59, at 56; Philippa Strum, 
(Untitled), 79 J. AM. HIST. 1207, 1207–08 (1992) (reviewing BARBARA A. 
PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, 
AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS (1991)); Ashby, supra note 65, at 16–17. 
 101. See Goldman, supra note 100, at 195. But see Horwitz, supra note 100, 
at 127. 
502 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
tract members of that constituency as voters.102 Members of the 
religious community may have viewed a Supreme Court ap-
pointment as confirmation of their “integration into American 
public life.”103 In 1836, Justice Roger Taney was the first Ro-
man Catholic appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court—he was 
later appointed Chief Justice by Andrew Jackson— but religion 
had little to do with his appointment, and no Catholic served 
on the court for thirty years after his death.104 The “Catholic 
seat” on the U.S. Supreme Court is said to have begun with the 
appointment of Justice Edward White in 1894, who was subse-
quently appointed Chief Justice in 1910 by William H. Taft in 
order to attract the Catholic vote, according to some.105 Religion 
played a definite role in the appointment of Justice Joseph 
McKenna to the Court by William McKinley in 1898, conse-
quent to which two Catholic justices served simultaneously on 
the Court for the first time in its history.106 The appointments 
of Justice Pierce Butler by Warren Harding in 1922 and Justice 
Frank Murphy by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 were similarly 
colored by considerations of religion.107 When Justice Murphy 
died in 1949, Harry Truman did not replace him with another 
Catholic justice, but Dwight Eisenhower restored the “Catholic 
seat” by appointing Justice William Brennan to the Court in 
1956.108 Religion had a marginal role, if any, in the appoint-
ments of subsequent Catholic justices to the court,109 as other 
diversity factors, such as race and gender, took precedence. 
The “Jewish seat” was established on the U.S. Supreme 
Court with the appointment of Justice Louis Brandeis to the 
Court by Woodrow Wilson in 1916.110 Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo was later appointed to the Court in 1932 by Herbert 
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Hoover, followed by Justice Felix Frankfurter (Roosevelt, in 
1939), Justice Arthur Goldberg (John F. Kennedy, in 1962), 
and Justice Abe Fortas (Lyndon Johnson, in 1965).111 With the 
resignation of Justice Fortas from the Court in 1969, Nixon 
chose not to continue the tradition of the “Jewish seat” on the 
court, appointing a Methodist (Justice Harry Blackmun) in-
stead.112 Scholars have suggested that the “Jewish seat” ended 
on the court because Republican presidents did not find it ad-
vantageous, as the Jewish vote was typically Democratic,113 
and Jewish leaders did not significantly pursue the issue.114 
Perry suggests that it came to an end because Jews had better 
assimilated into American society by that time, and gender be-
gan to take precedence on the Court.115 Others have suggested 
that the “Jewish seat” had outlived its usefulness, since the 
Jewish community had “shed its considerable insecurity,” and 
the community was not “overly disturbed” when the seat was 
eliminated.116 
Religion has generally been less relevant for appointments to 
the Court in the late-twentieth century.117 For example, the 
fact that Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy 
were Catholic was entirely coincidental to their appoint-
ments.118 As one commentator notes, “[r]eligious tensions have 
also cooled,”119 which is why religious “seats” on the Court have 
disappeared. Today, the Court has six Roman Catholic justices 
(Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor) and three Jewish 
justices (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena 
Kagan).120 With Justice Kagan’s appointment to the Court in 
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2010, for the first time since its establishment in 1789, the U.S. 
Supreme Court does not have a Protestant justice.121 However, 
one scholar has argued that religion was still a “plus” or “mi-
nus” factor for recent appointments made or sought to be made 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, as was the case with Chief Justice 
Roberts, who was questioned as to whether his religious beliefs 
would conflict with his ability to decide abortion cases.122 To 
some extent, those questions suggest that religion has ceased 
to become a form of descriptive or symbolic representation on 
the Court, but rather is now substantive or active representa-
tion—religion on the Court is no longer a symbol of inclusive-
ness, but its presence signals a fear that it may cloud legal in-
terpretation. 
Religious “seats” on supreme courts are not limited to the 
United States alone. In the Netherlands, until 1968, a practice 
existed that a vacancy on the Supreme Court arising out of the 
retirement or death of a Catholic judge would be followed by 
the appointment of a Catholic judge to the court.123 By 1913, 
the court had four Catholic judges.124 Seats were also reserved 
on the court for Protestants, and a Jewish judge was appointed 
occasionally.125 Although this custom is no longer followed on 
the Supreme Court, it is still “widely practiced” on other courts 
in the Netherlands.126 On the Supreme Court of Israel, a seat 
has typically been reserved for an Orthodox Jew, and since 
1962, a seat has unofficially been reserved for a Sephardic 
judge.127 There have been calls to appoint judges from different 
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religious and ethnic backgrounds to the Supreme Court of Isra-
el in order to make the court more “reflective”—as opposed to 
“representative”—of different groups within society.128 In Ger-
many, one scholar has suggested that a religious equilibrium 
(i.e., a balance between the Catholic and Protestant members 
of the court) be maintained on the Federal Constitutional 
Court, and there is some suggestion of implementing an infor-
mal norm that judges of Jewish ancestry be appointed to the 
court.129 Informal barriers existed in the United Kingdom 
against the appointment of Catholic and Jewish justices to 
higher courts, although in more recent times, the proportion of 
Jewish justices serving on higher courts is believed to be great-
er than the number of Jews in the general population.130 
In the United States, gender and race have replaced geogra-
phy and religion as informal diversity criteria in making judi-
cial appointments—as one commentator puts it, “the rules of 
diversity have changed.”131 There is a large volume of scholarly 
literature on the question of whether any particular system of 
appointing judges to state courts makes it more or less likely 
that racial minorities and women will be appointed.132 When 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court’s first African American 
justice, was appointed by Johnson to the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1967, the primary consideration was race.133 Similarly, gen-
der was the primary consideration when Justice O’Connor was 
appointed the first female justice on the Court by Ronald 
Reagan in 1981.134 Jimmy Carter is widely considered to be the 
first president to appoint women and racial minorities to the 
lower federal courts in large numbers.135 However, ethnic and 
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racial minorities are still considered underrepresented on fed-
eral and state courts,136 although great progress has been made 
in recent decades.137 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court has three 
female justices (Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan), one 
of whom also happens to be of Hispanic background (Justice 
Sotomayor), and one African American justice (Justice Thom-
as). 
Again, this form of diversity is not limited to the United 
States alone. In the United Kingdom, there has been “official 
support” for increasing diversity in the judiciary since the 
1990s.138 In order to thwart some of the problems associated 
with “tap on the shoulder” type appointments—where candi-
dates are approached and invited to become judges—judicial 
positions are now advertised and “nontraditional” candidates 
are encouraged to apply. The Judicial Appointments Commis-
sion under the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, established 
in 2006, has a statutory duty to “have regard to the need to en-
courage diversity in the range of persons available for selection 
for appointments.”139 The British judiciary, however, is still 
criticized for being largely elite, male, white, old, upper class, 
and out of touch.140 Baroness Hale of Richmond was the first 
female Law Lord appointed to the House of Lords, and as of 
this writing, she is the only female judge on the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom.141 In her own words, she was not the 
first woman lawyer good enough to sit with the other male 
judges, only the first one who was “visible to them.”142 The Aus-
tralian judicial system has been criticized for its absence of di-
versity—judges are typically male and of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic 
background.143 More recently, however, female justices have 
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increasingly been appointed to the High Court of Australia. 
The first female justice to be appointed to that court was Mary 
Gaudron in 1987—the first female amongst forty-four justices 
appointed to the High Court in the last century.144 However, 
the court now has three female justices (Susan Crennan, Susan 
Kiefel, and Virginia Bell, appointed in 2005, 2007, and 2009, 
respectively). The constitution of South Africa contains an ex-
plicit requirement that the need to “reflect broadly the racial 
and gender composition of South Africa must be considered 
when judicial officers are appointed.”145 Women and black 
judges have increasingly been appointed to the courts.146 How-
ever, gender diversity in South Africa is considered subordinate 
to racial diversity.147 Consequently, as Chief Justice Arthur 
Chaskalson noted in his retirement speech in 2005, although 
50 percent of the judiciary was black, only 15 percent consisted 
of women.148 Two original members of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa were women (Kate O’Regan and Yvonne Mok-
goro) and the court presently has two women serving on it 
(Bess Nkabinde-Mmono and Sisi Khampepe).149 Canada has 
made some of the strongest efforts at attaining gender diversi-
ty.150 Bertha Wilson, in 1982, became the first female justice 
appointed to the court.151 When this was written, the Canadian 
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court had four female justices serving—its Chief Justice (Bev-
erley McLachlin) and Justices Marie Deschamps, Rosalie Sil-
berman Abella, Andromache Karakatsanis—only one short of a 
female majority.152 
II. DIVERSITY AND THE ICC 
Eligibility for appointment to one of the eighteen positions on 
the ICC requires a candidate to satisfy four criteria: character, 
experience, fluency, and diversity.153 First, judges have to pos-
sess “high moral character, impartiality and integrity,” and 
ought to be qualified in their own states for appointment to the 
highest judicial office.154 Second, they ought to possess estab-
lished competence in one of two areas: criminal law and proce-
dure or international law.155 Third, judges must be fluent in 
one of the working languages of the court.156 Fourth, judges 
must come from diverse geographic (and demographic) back-
grounds—no two judges can be nationals of the same state157—
and in appointing judges to the court, States Parties (i.e., the 
countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC)158 
must take account of the need for: (1) representation of the 
principal legal systems of the world, (2) equitable geographic 
representation, and (3) fair representation of female and male 
judges.159 The Rome Statute, which establishes the ICC and 
sets out its powers, is perhaps the “first major international 
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agreement” to emphasize gender representation.160 According-
ly, the formal provisions of the Rome Statute call for three 
types of diversity in appointing judges to the ICC: geographic 
diversity, gender diversity, and a diversity of professional expe-
riences. 
However, although judicial appointments to the ICC have to 
be made on considerations of diversity, between 2003 and 2011, 
the diversity rule of the court did not guarantee equal repre-
sentation to different groups. Thus, for example, judges with 
experience in criminal law and procedure have typically out-
numbered those with experience in international law.161 Since 
the court deals with criminal law cases, experience in criminal 
law is perhaps naturally considered more valuable than gener-
alist experience in the field of international law. Since 2009, 
the female judges on the court have outnumbered the male 
judges—the ICC is perhaps one of the few prominent courts in 
the world to have accomplished this. Typically, though not uni-
versally, at least half of the judges appointed to the ICC have 
significant prior judicial experience working either on a high 
court in their home countries or on an international tribunal or 
court. 
Like the other international tribunals, geographic diversity 
on the ICC is measured in terms of regional subgroups. Five 
regional subgroups are sought to be informally represented on 
the court: Western European and Others Group of States 
(“WEOG”), Latin American and Caribbean Group of States 
(“GRULAC”), Asian Group of States (“Asian States”), African 
Group of States (“African States”), and the Group of Eastern 
European States (“Eastern Europe”). Although there is no for-
mal law that requires this, and although cases which the ICC 
have dealt with predominantly concern Africa so far, since its 
inception the largest number of judges on the ICC have always 
come from the WEOG states. Further, both the P5 countries 
that are States Parties to the Rome Statute (the United King-
                                                                                                             
 160. Aceves, supra note 56, at 384–85. 
 161. In other words, the “List A” judges have typically always outnumbered 
the “List B” judges. However, consequent to the 2007 elections, the total 
number of List A and List B judges on the court was the same, until the elec-
tion in 2009. Under article 36(5) of the Rome Statute, there are supposed to 
be two lists of candidates for election to the court—broadly speaking, List A 
consists of candidates who have criminal law expertise, while List B consists 
of candidates with international law expertise. 
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dom and France) have always had one of their judges serve on 
the court. Thus, for example, when Claude Jorda (France) re-
signed from the court in 2009, Bruno Cotte (France) was ap-
pointed to the court to compensate for the French vacancy. 
Similarly, when Sir Adrian Fulford’s (United Kingdom) term on 
the court came to an end in 2012, Howard Morrison (United 
Kingdom) was appointed to the court to compensate for the 
British vacancy on the court. Chart 1 below reveals that the 
number of judges from the African States has gradually in-
creased on the ICC, perhaps when it increasingly began to be 
realized that the court’s docket dealt primarily with cases of 
that region. Having a large contingent of judges from the Afri-
can States is therefore perhaps necessary from the point of 
view of the court’s legitimacy. One gets the sense that the 
GRULAC contingent on the court has diminished in strength 

















Unlike the ICJ and several national supreme courts, the ICC 
does not regularly convene in plenary sessions to perform its 
work.162 Instead, the ICC has three divisions, and each division 
performs its work in chambers. The three divisions are: Ap-
                                                                                                             
 162. See ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/ic
c%20at%20a%20glance.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
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peals, Trial, and Pre-Trial.163 The Appeals Division consists of 
the president of the ICC and four other judges.164 The Trial and 
Pre-Trial Divisions consist of not less than six judges each.165 
ICC judges typically serve nine year non-renewable terms in 
office,166 and judges assigned to the Appeals Chamber must 
spend the entire length of their terms on that chamber,167 per-
haps to ensure that they are insulated from being biased in fa-
vor of judges whose decisions they are considering on appeal. 
Judges in the other divisions are required to serve in that divi-
sion for a three year term,168 which suggests that they possibly 
rotate between divisions. The Rome Statute mandates diversity 
even in the allocation of judges to divisions. Thus, each division 
is required to have an “appropriate combination” of expertise in 
criminal law and procedure and in international law.169 Fur-
ther, the Trial and Pre-Trial divisions are to be composed pri-
marily of judges with criminal experience.170 
There are five regional subgroups on the ICC, but not all 
have been equally represented on the Appeals Chamber. Judge 
Song (Asian States) and Judge Kourula (WEOG) have served 
on the Appeals Chamber since the inception of the ICC.171 
Nearly 80 percent of the decisions of the Appeals Chamber 
were issued by either Judge Kirsch (WEOG), Judge Pillay (Af-
rican States), and Judge Pikis (Asian States), or by Judge 
Ušacka (Eastern Europe), Judge Nsereko (African States), and 
Judge Kuenychia (African States), along with Judges Song and 
Kourula. Thus, a GRULAC state has never had a judge on the 
Appeals Chamber. Between 2006 and 2008, cases were decided 
by an Appeals Chamber that had two judges each from the 
Asian States and WEOG, and only one judge from the African 
States. However, more recently, the balance has tipped in favor 
                                                                                                             
 163. See Chambers, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/Pages/chamb
ers.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 164. Rome Statute, supra note 153, art. 39(1). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. art. 36(9)(a). However, a judge assigned to a Trial or Appeals 
Chamber must stay on until a trial or appeal is concluded. Id. art. 36(10). 
 167. Id. art. 39(3)(b). 
 168. Id. art. 39(3)(a). 
 169. Id. art. 39(1). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Both judges served on the court initially from 2003–2006, and their 
terms were later renewed until 2015. 
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of the African States, and cases decided by the Appeals Cham-
ber from 2009 onwards typically had two judges from the Afri-
can States and one each from WEOG, the Asian States, and 
Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the heavy presence of Africa on 
the docket of the ICC has ensured that the African judges on 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICC outnumber judges from each 
individual sub-region on that chamber. 
Interestingly, although the ICC has a majority of judges with 
criminal law experience serving on it, the Appeals Chamber 
typically has a majority of judges with generalist international 
law experience. At an appellate level, it is perhaps thought fit 
to have judges think of the law on generalist terms at a norma-
tive level, instead of at a technical criminal law level. Further, 
although the ICC has had a majority of female judges serving 
on it since 2009, the Appeals Chamber has typically always 
featured a majority of male judges. In terms of diversity of 
gender and professional experience, the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICC therefore stands in contrast to the general body of the 
ICC. 
III. DOES DIVERSITY IMPACT DECISION MAKING ON THE ICC? 
I decided to quantitatively test whether diversity makes any 
difference to the manner in which cases are decided on the Ap-
peals Chamber of the ICC. Although only one case has been 
concluded by the ICC so far,172 and the vast majority of its “de-
cisions” are housekeeping matters (e.g., directions for the pros-
ecution and defense to file replies within stipulated periods of 
time, orders scheduling hearings and appointing presiding of-
ficers, etc.), the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has issued a size-
able number of decisions in cases involving adversarial con-
tests. I decided to test whether the presence of a higher number 
of African judges on the Appeals Chamber of the ICC made the 
court more or less likely to hold in favor of African defendants. 
So far, the ICC has dealt exclusively with cases arising out of 
Africa, and appointments made to the ICC in recent times have 
                                                                                                             
 172. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC First Verdict: 
Thomas Lubanga Guilty of Conscripting and Enlisting Children Under the 
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reflected a shift towards appointing more judges from the Afri-
can States. My research question was: does a higher number of 
African judges on the court make the court more or less de-
fendant friendly, given that all the defendants are of African 
origin? 
As discussed above, before 2009, the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICC had only one judge from the African States serving on it. 
Judges Song, Kirsch, Pikis, Pillay, and Kourula decided the 
vast majority of cases in the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber. Only 
Judge Pillay belonged to the African States. However, starting 
in 2009, the Appeals Chamber had two judges from the African 
States serving on it. Judges Kuenychia, Kourula, Ušacka, 
Nsereko, and Song decided the vast majority of cases in the 
post-2009 Appeals Chamber, which included Judges Kuenychia 
and Nsereko of the African States. The post-2009 Appeals 
Chamber also had an Eastern Europe judge serving on it 
(Ušacka). The question was, controlling for other variables, did 
the pre- and post-2009 Appeals Chambers of the ICC adopt dif-
ferent attitudes towards defendants? 
I systematically analyzed decisions173 of the Appeals Cham-
ber of the ICC between 2006 and 2012.174 Each decision was 
                                                                                                             
 173. Including orders and judgments. 
 174. I did not count any of the following types of decisions of the Appeals 
Chamber: orders appointing a presiding judge, setting time limits, directing 
the prosecution or defense to respond to an application for extension of time 
or page limits, scheduling orders, requests for views of parties, or decisions 
where the arguments of the prosecution and defense were aligned (e.g., where 
both took the same position towards an attempted amici intervention or vic-
tim participation, etc.), where the contest was not one between the prosecu-
tion and defense (e.g., where the prosecution and registrar of the court were 
in contest), or where the Appeals Chamber did not conclusively find in favor 
of either prosecution or defense over the other (e.g., where the Appeals 
Chamber found merit in the cross appeals of both the prosecution and de-
fense and reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision). The following types of cases 
were counted: grants of applications for extension of time, rejections of docu-
ments as being inadmissible, ex parte orders seeking to know from the prose-
cution why certain documents should continue to remain confidential, and of 
course, confirmations or reversals of appeals. If a trial chamber’s decision was 
partly reversed and partly affirmed, then the Appeals Chamber was counted 
as having decided in favor of the prosecution if more of the prosecution’s con-
tentions were accepted rather than denied, and vice versa. A conscious at-
tempt was made to code cases by outcome. Thus, where the Appeals Chamber 
found that the prosecution’s request for an extension of page limits was su-
perfluous, because the prosecution erroneously believed the page limit to be 
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coded based on its outcome and assigned a value of 1 if the de-
cision went in favor of the defendant and 0 if the decision went 
against the defendant or in favor of the prosecution. The inde-
pendent variable was whether the case was decided by the pre-
2009 or post-2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC—the decision 
was assigned a value of 1 if it was decided by the post-2009 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC and 0 if it was decided by the pre-
2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC. I controlled for the type of 
case with which the Appeals Chamber was dealing based on 
the identity of the defendant. Thus, for example, if the defend-
ant in the decision was Joseph Kony,175 the decision was as-
signed a value of 1, if not, a value of 0, and this process was re-
peated for each defendant variable. The results of the logistic 
regression analysis are set out below. 
The upshot is that the post-2009 Appeals Chamber—the one 
with two African judges—held against the defendant at a sta-
tistically significant level176 when compared to the pre-2009 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC. This is suggestive of the hypothe-
sis that the geographic and national background of judges does, 
in fact, make a difference to the manner in which cases are de-
cided. The regression analysis I have conducted suggests that 
the presence of more African judges on the Appeals Chamber 
may have made it more likely for the Appeals Chamber to de-
cide cases against the defendants, all of whom were African. 
Perhaps African judges, who are more closely aware of the 
atrocities alleged to have been committed by the defendants, 
are less likely to decide cases in favor of African defendants. 
Their presence in a larger number on the Appeals Chamber of 
                                                                                                             
twenty pages (whereas it was 100 pages), the case was counted as a pro-
prosecution case, since the prosecution achieved its desired re-
sult/interpretation in outcome. 
 175. The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and 





nded+on+27th+September+2005.htm. Kony stands accused of crimes against 
humanity, enslavement of children, etc. See generally KATHY COOK, STOLEN 
ANGELS: THE KIDNAPPED GIRLS OF UGANDA (2007). 
 176. The p value is 0.0412. 
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the ICC might have had a “panel effect”177 on the working of 
the chamber. 
 
Dependent Variable: OUTCOME   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 03/07/12 Time: 13:50   
Sample: 1 76    
Included observations: 76   
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
  
BENCH -2.617438 1.281890 -2.041859 0.0412
MBARUSHIMANA 2.617438 1.625805 1.609934 0.1074
MUTHAURA 1.231144 1.700953 0.723796 0.4692
KATANGA -0.223144 0.670820 -0.332643 0.7394
GOMBO 2.165453 1.370039 1.580577 0.1140
KONY 1.750666 1.192555 1.467997 0.1421
JAMUS 2.617438 1.908728 1.371300 0.1703
DYILO -0.470004 0.403113 -1.165936 0.2436
   
Mean dependent var 0.394737   S.D. dependent var 0.492042
S.E. of regression 0.486710   Akaike info criterion 1.436254
Sum squared resid 16.10828   Schwarz criterion 1.681594
Log likelihood -46.57764   Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.534304
Deviance 93.15528   Restr. deviance 101.9646
Avg. log likelihood -0.612864    
    
Obs with Dep=0 46    Total obs 76 
Obs with Dep=1 30    
          
However, it is important to underscore that the evidence pre-
sented above is only suggestive and not conclusive of the hy-
pothesis that geographic background impacts decision making. 
Although both the pre- and post-2009 Appeals Chambers had 
the same number of List A and List B judges (i.e., the same 
number of judges who were criminal law specialists and inter-
national law generalists), the post-2009 Appeals Chamber had 
                                                                                                             
 177. CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2006). 
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two female judges on it as opposed to the pre-2009 Appeals 
Chamber which had only one female judge. It is possible that 
the presence of a higher number of female judges would make 
the Appeals Chamber more likely to decide cases against de-
fendants (all of whom were male), particularly when many vic-
tims of the crimes were women—but the evidence presented in 
the coming paragraphs tends to negate this theory. It is possi-
ble that the presence of the Eastern Europe judge on the post-
2009 Appeals Chamber had an impact on the court’s likelihood 
to decide cases against the defendant—but the evidence pre-
sented in the coming paragraphs tends to negate this hypothe-
sis as well. The evidence does not rule out the possibility that 
the Appeals Chamber might have become less defendant-
friendly over time. However, the evidence suggests that geo-
graphic factors, namely the presence of an additional judge 
from the African States, could possibly explain the Appeals 
Chamber’s statistically significant unfriendly attitude towards 
defendants after 2009. 
Judges dissented in approximately 30 percent of the coded 
decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC—decisions that 
were genuine contests and not housekeeping matters. More de-
cisions generated dissent in the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber 
than in the post-2009 Appeals Chamber, and the difference in 
the proportion of dissents recorded in the pre- and post-2009 
Appeals Chambers was statistically significant.178 Further, 
there was a statistically significant (at the 90 percent confi-
dence interval) negative relationship between the outcome of 
the decision (i.e., whether it was pro- or anti-defendant) and 
whether a dissent would be recorded in the decision—in other 
words, there was a higher likelihood of a dissent being recorded 
if the majority decision went in favor of prosecution than if it 
went in favor of the defense. The results of the logistic regres-
sion are reported below. The data suggest that dissenters were 
typically pro-defendant, and given that a statistically signifi-
cant higher proportion of dissents were recorded in the pre-
2009 Appeals Chamber, this is more evidence that the pre-2009 




                                                                                                             
 178. P value: 0.0131. 











The dissenting judges were almost overwhelmingly from the 
Asian States. Judges Pikis and Song were the key dissenters on 
the Appeals Chamber. Chart 2 breaks the dissents on the court 
down by region and Chart 3 breaks the figures down by the in-
dividual dissenting judge. Importantly, judges from the African 
States recorded the lowest level of dissent on the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICC. Since the data above reveal that dissent-
ers tended to be pro-defendant, the fact that judges from the 
African States recorded the lowest level of dissent adds weight 
to the hypothesis that they were more anti-defendant than oth-
er judges on the Appeals Chamber. After the Asian States 
judges, the highest number of dissenting votes during this pe-
riod were recorded by a female judge—Anita Ušacka—also the 
only Eastern Europe judge on the Appeals Chamber between 
2009 and 2012 for the cases coded. Although Judge Ušacka reg-
istered only three dissenting votes during this period, in two of 
those three cases the majority of the Appeals Chamber decided 
the case against the defendant. Again, this tends to suggest 
that the presence of more female judges on the post-2009 Ap-
peals Chamber, and the presence of the Eastern Europe judge 
in that Chamber, may not have been the influences driving the 
shift in the Appeals Chamber’s attitude towards defendants 
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Much of the scholarly literature surveyed in this Article ar-
gues that diversity enhances a court’s legitimacy by making it 
seem more inclusive. However, this Article presents evidence to 
suggest that the legitimacy of international courts might be 
undermined by a justifiable fear that judges from particular 
geographic regions—regions that dominate judgeships on in-
ternational courts—might harbor conscious or subconscious 
biases towards or against certain causes. The results of this 
study are suggestive, but not conclusive. The quantitative 
analysis relies on only seventy-six observations, and a more 
definitive answer to my research question cannot be provided 
until a substantially larger number of decisions are issued by 
the ICC. However, the analysis in this Article suggests that the 
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geographic background of a judge has the capacity to impact 
the manner in which he or she decides cases. What this means 
for the international system is that the criterion of “fair” geo-
graphic representation in appointing judges to international 
courts must be carefully assessed. The presence of a higher 
number of judges from the African States might bolster the le-
gitimacy of the ICC—the court may consequently be seen as a 
truly inclusive judicial body, and not merely as an institution 
where “outsiders” pass judgment on Africans. At the same 
time, however, the presence of a higher number of judges from 
the African States on the ICC has the potential to undermine 
the very legitimacy of the court that its inclusiveness seeks to 
engender. By virtue of their backgrounds, judges may appear to 
be biased against the African defendants whose alleged crimes 
they know so well. Allegations of bias can be as damaging to a 
court’s legitimacy as accusations of under-inclusiveness. 
This Article does not canvas an argument that diversity on 
international or national courts is illegitimate or inadvisable. 
There are tensions between diversity and impartiality on 
courts, but these tensions can be appropriately addressed by 
staffing judgeships fairly amongst diverse constituencies or 
groups. The problem with the norm of geographic representa-
tion on international courts is that it is rarely ever truly or 
honestly inclusive. Judges of P5 countries dominate judgeships 
on international bodies, as do judges of regions that have a 
stake in the stability and security of the region with which the 
court deals. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC has five judges 
serving on it and representation on the Chamber can conse-
quently be given to each of the five regional subgroups—but 
this has not happened. A judge each from France and the Unit-
ed Kingdom has always served on the ICC, and judges from the 
African States have increasingly been appointed to the court. 
This undermines the perception that the ICC, or any other in-
ternational court, is a neutral adjudicator of disputes, one 
which dispassionately applies international law to specific fac-
tual situations in a political vacuum. Instead, the court opens 
itself up to accusations of bias which may undermine its credi-
bility and unseat the very legitimacy that a system of diversity 
seeks to create. In order to be perceived as legitimate, the norm 
of geographic diversity on international courts must embrace 
true diversity—not just diversity fostered by geopolitical reali-
ties. 
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Ghana F 2003-06 2006-15  
René 
BLATTMANN  




A GRULAC Trinidad 
& Tobago 
M 2003-12  Resig. 





Cyprus M 2003-09   
Elizabeth ODIO 
BENITO  
A GRULAC Costa 
Rica 












Korea M 2003-06 2006-15  
Hans-Peter 
KAUL  
B WEOG Germany M 2003-06 2006-15  
Mauro POLITI  B WEOG Italy M 2003-09   
Maureen Harding 
CLARK  
A WEOG Ireland F 2003-12  Resig. 
Erkki KOURULA  B WEOG Finland M 2003-06 2006-15  
Fatoumata Dem-
bele DIARRA  
A African 
States 
Mali F 2003-12   
Anita UŠACKA  B Eastern 
Europe 
Latvia F 2003-06 2006-15  
Sir Adrian 
FULFORD  
A WEOG UK M 2003-12   





Samoa M 2003-06   












Uganda M 2007-12   
Fumiko SAIGA B Asian 
States 
Japan F 2007-09 2009-18 Death 
Bruno COTTE A WEOG France  2008-12   
Joyce ALUOCH A African 
States 









B GRULAC Guyana M 2009-18  Resig. 
Cuno 
TARFUSSER 




A WEOG Belgium F 2009-18   
FERNÁNDEZ DE 
GURMENDI 
A GRULAC Argentina F 2010-18   
Kuniko OZAKI B Asian 
States 












A GRULAC Trinidad 
& Tobago 
M 2012-21   











F 2012-21   
Howard 
MORRISON 





Nigeria M 2012-21   
Source: These data have been complied by the author, using information posted on the website of the ICC. 
